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ABSTRACT
We introduce a novel method for defining geographic districts
in road networks using stable matching. In this approach, each
geographic district is defined in terms of a center, which identifies
a location of interest, such as a post office or polling place, and all
other network vertices must be labeled with the center to which
they are associated. We focus on defining geographic districts that
are equitable, in that every district has the same number of vertices
and the assignment is stable in terms of geographic distance. That
is, there is no unassigned vertex-center pair such that both would
prefer each other over their current assignments. We solve this
problem using a version of the classic stable matching problem,
called symmetric stable matching, in which the preferences of the
elements in both sets obey a certain symmetry. In our case, we
study a graph-based version of stable matching in which nodes are
stably matched to a subset of nodes denoted as centers, prioritized
by their shortest-path distances, so that each center is apportioned
a certain number of nodes. We show that, for a planar graph or road
network with n nodes and k centers, the problem can be solved
in O(n√n logn) time, which improves upon the O(nk) runtime of
using the classic Gale–Shapley stable matching algorithm when k
is large. Finally, we provide experimental results on road networks
for these algorithms and a heuristic algorithm that performs better
than the Gale–Shapley algorithm for any range of values of k .
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Network data models; • Theory of
computation→ Shortest paths;
KEYWORDS
road networks, stable matching, geographic districting
1 INTRODUCTION
Location analysis is a classical branch of optimization in geographic
information systems, concerned both with facility location, the
placement of centers to serve geographic regions such as polling
places, fire stations, or post offices, and the assignment problem,
the problem of surrounding these facilities by service regions in
an optimal way, so that all points are equitably served by nearby
facilities and each facility bears a fair portion of the total service
load. This problem includes, for instance, the special case of political
districting in which the requirements for fairness (avoiding unfair
gerrymandered districts) include both geographic compactness and
equal representivity with respect to the broader population. (E.g.,
see [18–20].)
In this work, we consider a geographic abstraction of the assign-
ment problem in which the facility locations have already been de-
termined through some other algorithm. We model the geographic
space of interest as a weighted, undirected graph representing a
road network, we model the population to be assigned to facilities
as the set of all vertices of the graph, and we model the facility
locations as a subset of k chosen center nodes of the graph. Each
center has a quota indicating how many nodes it should match. The
desired output is an assignment of every node to a center, such that
the set of assigned nodes for each center equals its quota. The use
of quotas in this way allows each of the facilities to have different
operational capacities in terms of how much of the population they
can serve.
We impose the conditions that each node has a preference for
centers ordered by shortest-path distance from the node, and each
center has a preference for nodes ordered by their distances from
the center. Our goal is to match each center to its quota number of
nodes and for the matching to be stable, meaning that no node and
center that are not assigned to each other prefer each other to their
specified matches. Rather than optimizing some computationally
challenging global quality criterion, we seek an assignment of nodes
to centers that is stable.
We are offering this combined notion of giving each center a
quota and optimizing stability in terms of distance-based prefer-
ences as a type of equitability for defining geographic districts.
Quotas provide fairness in terms of the number of nodes assigned
to each center and stability provides fairness in terms of how those
nodes are assigned.
Defining geographic districts that are equitable implies a certain
amount of “compactness” for districts, which avoids the types of
highly non-compact districts that have been the subject of recent
legal cases involving gerrymandering. This is a characteristic of
our use of stable matching for assigning nodes to centers based
on symmetric distance-based preferences. This notion does not,
however, imply that equitable districts are necessarily convex or
even connected. Indeed, depending on the placement of centers
and how quotas are defined, it may be necessary for some districts
to be disconnected.
Formally, we define the stable graph matching problem as fol-
lows:
Definition 1.1 (Stable graph matching problem). Given an undi-
rected, weighted graph and a subset of k nodes denoted centers,
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Figure 1: The solutions to the stable graphmatching problem for the 2010 road networks of three U.S. states and the District of
Columbia, from the DIMACS database [4]. They consists of primary and secondary roads in the biggest connected component
of the road networks. In each case, n andm denote the number of nodes and edges, respectively, and there are k = 6 random
centers with equal quota n/k .
find an assignment from each node to a centers such that (i) the
same number of nodes is assigned to each center, up to round-off
errors, and (ii) the matching is stable with respect to shortest-path
distances; that is, there is no node u and center c such that u is not
assigned to c , u is closer to c than to its assigned center, and c is
closer to u than to one (any) of the nodes assigned to c .
Figure 1 illustrates these properties for solutions to our stable
graph matching problem for the road networks of three U.S. states
and the District of Columbia, with k = 6 randomly-placed centers
and equal quotas.
1.1 New Results
In the standard stable matching problem, preferences are arbitrary.
Each individual may choose as his or her preferences any permu-
tation of the opposite-set individuals, independently of all other
choices. Preferences resulting from shortest-path distances in an
undirected graph are not arbitrary, however. Instead, they obey a
certain symmetry property coming from the undirected nature of
the graph and shortest paths within the graph. To capitalize on this
idea, we define an abstract problem intermediate between stable
graph matching and stable matching, which we call the symmetric
stable matching problem. Stable graph matching is a particular case
of symmetric stable matching. We observe that for a symmetric sta-
ble matching of n nodes with k centers, the classical Gale–Shapley
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algorithm can compute a solution in time O(nk), once all distances
between nodes and centers have been computed.
Moreover, we develop a novel nearest-neighbor chain algorithm
for any symmetric stable matching problem, using ideas borrowed
from a very different application of nearest-neighbor chains, in hi-
erarchical clustering problems [2, 14]. Our algorithm can be applied
to stable graph matching and extends our previous work on stable
grid matching [6], another case of symmetric stable matching. It
runs in O(n · T (n)) time, where T (n) is the time per operation of
a data structure for updating a dynamic subset of points from the
given metric space and answering nearest neighbors to these points.
In the graph setting, this means that we need to be able to find the
closest center of a node, and vice versa, efficiently. By using the
data structure for road networks from [7], withT (n) = O(√n logn),
the stable graph matching problem can be solved in O(n√n logn)
time.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We formulate the stable graph matching problem and its
generalization, the symmetric stable matching problem.
• We describe a general class of algorithms for solving sym-
metric stable matching, the mutual closest pair algorithms,
and prove that for symmetric stable matching (and unlike
stable matching more generally) the solution is always
unique.
• We define and analyze the nearest-neighbor chain algo-
rithm for symmetric stable matchings. As we show, for
inputs that can support nearest-neighbor queries on dy-
namic subsets of the input preferences, with time T (n) per
update or nearest-neighbor query, we can find a symmetric
stable matching in time O(nT (n)).
• We provide a heuristic circle-growing improvement to the
Gale–Shapley algorithm for the case of stable graph match-
ing. Our heuristic does not improve the O(nk) worst-case
time of the algorithm, but we expect it to provide signifi-
cant speedups in practice.
• We provide an experimental comparison of our algorithms
on real-world road networks. Our experiments confirm the
independence from k of the running time of our nearest-
neighbor based algorithm, and they also confirm the effi-
cacy of our heuristic circle-growing improvement to the
Gale–Shapley algorithm.
1.2 Prior Related Work
Our notion of equitability introduces an interesting new (and more
realistic) twist to Knuth’s classic post office problem [15]. In the
classic post office problem, one is given a collection of sites called
“post offices” and one is interested in assigning nodes to their near-
est post office with no consideration for quotas characterizing the
capacity of each post office to handle mail. Thus, the classic post
office problem is equivalent to our geographic districting problem
with unbounded quotas. Knuth’s discussion of the classic post office
problem has given rise to a long line of research on spatial parti-
tioning, including the important Voronoi diagrams (e.g., see [1]),
which have also been extended to the graph setting [8].
The stable matching problem, which is also known as the stable
marriage problem, was introduced by Gale and Shapley [9]. This
problem was originally described in terms of matching n men and
n women based on each person having an ordered preference list
for the members of the opposite sex in this group. In that context,
stability means that no man–woman pair prefer each other to their
assigned choices. Stability, defined in this way, is a necessary condi-
tion (and more important than, e.g., total utility) in order to prevent
extramarital affairs. When generalized to the one-to-many case, this
problem is also called the college admission problem [21], because
it models a setting where n students are stably matched to k < n
colleges, each with a certain quota of admissions. Indeed, solutions
to this one-to-many stable matching problem are currently used to
match medical students to residency programs in some countries,
such as the US.
The standard algorithm used today for computing a stable match-
ing with arbitrary preferences is the original Gale–Shapley algo-
rithm [9]. This algorithm finds a stable matching in time O(nk) in
the one-to-many (college admission) case or in O(n2) time in the
one-to-one (men and women) case. Moreover, these running times
are the best possible for arbitrary preferences, since just reading
the input in the one-to-many case requires Ω(nk) time and Ω(n2)
time in the one-to-one case. Intuitively, the one-to-one version of
their algorithm involves each man making proposals to women
according to his preference order and each woman accepting a
proposal if it is her first or if it offers her a better match based on
her preference order.
Existing research about stable matching studies variations such
as matching with added constraints [16], preferences with ties [12],
and many more, e.g., see [13, 17]. However, the assumption that
preferences are arbitrary has rarely been challenged. A first step in
this direction was taken by Hoffman et al. [11], who considered the
mathematical properties of a stable matching in a geometric setting,
where “colleges” are points in R2 and “students” are all the points
in R2, and both use distances as preferences. Eppstein et al. [6]
extended their approach to images, where “students” and “colleges”
are pixels, but their work does not extend to general graphs and
road networks.
2 SYMMETRIC STABLE MATCHING
We present the symmetric stable matching problem in the one-to-
many context of schools and students, and therefore all the results
in this section also apply to the one-to-one case of men and women.
In order to formulate the symmetric stable matching problem,
consider this alternative but equivalent definition of the stable
matching problem. Each agent (school or student) gives a unique
score to each agent from the other set, and ranks them in increasing
order of these scores. Therefore, a set of scores such as (a ← 7,b ←
2, c ← 10) corresponds to the list of preferences (b,a, c).
We call the preferences symmetric if the score of x for y equals
the score of y for x . Moreover, in this case, we call these scores
distances.
Definition 2.1. A stable matching problem is symmetric if the
preferences are symmetric.
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2.1 Mutual closest pair algorithm
Before introducing our nearest-neighbor chain algorithm for sym-
metric stable matching, we describe a simplified version of it, the
mutual closest pair algorithm.
Definition 2.2. In a stable matching problem, a mutual closest
pair is a school and a student who have each other as first choice.
The algorithm is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3. If preferences are symmetric, a mutual closest pair
always exists.
Proof. Let s and x be the student and school whose distance is
the global minimum, that is, no other school and student are closer
to each other than s and x . Then, s and x are a mutual closest pair:
s is the closest student to x , and x is the closest school to s . □
Although the pair realizing the global minimum distance are
always a mutual closest pair, the reverse is not true: there can be
other mutual closest pairs whose distance is not a global minimum.
Moreover, Lemma 2.3 and its proof require that the distances on
which we are basing preferences be symmetric. If they are not
symmetric, as may be the case for shortest path distances in a
directed graph, then there might not be any mutual closest pairs.
Now we describe our symmetric stable matching algorithm:
Algorithm 1. Mutual closest pair algorithm
Input: n students andm schools with symmetric preferences,
and school quotas adding up to n.
Output: a stable matching between the students and schools.
(1) Initialize the matching empty.
(2) Repeat while there is an unmatched student:
(a) Find a mutual closest pair s,x .
(b) Match s and x , remove the student from the pool of
unmatched students, reduce the quota of the school
by one and remove it from the pool of unmatched
schools if its the quota reached zero.
Due to Lemma 2.3, the algorithm will never fail to find a closest
mutual pair. Next, we prove that the resulting matching is stable,
that is, that there are no blocking pairs (a student and a school
that are not matched to each other but prefer each other to their
assigned choices).
Theorem 2.4. Algorithm 1 finds a stable solution to any symmetric
stable matching problem.
Proof. Suppose student s is matched to school x , but she prefers
school y. When s and x were matched by the algorithm, x was the
closest school to s , soy already had quota zero. Therefore,ymatched
all of its students while s was not matched yet. But y was matched
with students other than s , who must have been closer to y than s .
Hence, s and y are not a blocking pair. □
Lemma 2.5. If s and x are a mutual closest pair of a symmetric
stable matching problem, then every stable solution to the problem
must match s to x .
Proof. If s and x were each matched to someone other than
each other, they would form an unstable pair. □
Theorem 2.6. Any symmetric stable matching problem has a
unique solution, which will be found by any instance of Algorithm 1.
Proof. Let S be any solution to the problem; at least one solution
S exists by Theorem 2.4. Let s and x be a mutual closest pair, which
must exist by Lemma 2.3. By Lemma 2.5, s and x are matched to
each other in S . Because Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to find a correct
solution (Theorem 2.4 again), it necessarily matches s with x , so its
behavior on s and x agrees with solution S . These two elements s
and x cannot form any mutual closest pairs with other elements,
so if we remove both of them from the given problem, we obtain a
smaller problem such that the restriction of S to the smaller problem
is still stable and such that the restriction of Algorithm 1 to the
smaller problem agrees with its behavior on the whole problem.
The result follows by induction on the size of the problem. □
Eeckhout [5] stated a sufficient condition for a unique solution in
one-to-one stable matchings. It can be shown that symmetric pref-
erences satisfy this condition, and hence uniqueness also follows
from their result in the one-to-one case.
Algorithm 1 leaves open how to actually find a mutual closest
pair, but any strategy that finds mutual closest pairs will work
correctly. Although different strategiesmay choose thematches that
they make in different orderings, and may take different running
times, they will always produce the same overall matching. In the
next section, we present one strategy for quickly finding mutual
closest pairs by making use of a dynamic nearest-neighbor data
structure. This data structure should be able to maintain a set of
agents of the same type (students or schools) and answer queries
asking for the closest one to a query agent of the opposite set.
Moreover, it should support deletions, that is, allow to remove
elements from the set.
2.2 Nearest-neighbor chain algorithm
The following algorithm, which we call the Nearest-neighbor chain
algorithm, is based on the theory of hierarchical clustering [2, 14],
and was first used in the context of stable matching (for grid-based
geometric data only) in [6].
Algorithm 2. Nearest-neighbor chain algorithm
Input: n students andm schools with symmetric preferences,
and school quotas adding up to n.
Output: a stable matching between the students and schools.
(1) Initialize the matching empty.
(2) Initialize a dynamic nearest-neighbor structure containing
the students, and one containing the schools.
(3) Initialize an empty stack S .
(4) Repeat while there is an unmatched student:
(a) If S is empty, add any unmatched student (or school)
to it.
(b) Let p be the agent at the top of the stack, and use
the nearest-neighbor structures to find its nearest-
neighbor q of the opposite set.
(c) If q is not already in S , add it.
(d) Otherwise, q must be the second-from-top element
in S (as justified below), and p and q are a mutual
closest pair. In this case, match p and q, and update
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the data structures accordingly: remove the student
from the nearest-neighbor structure of students, re-
duce the quota of the school by one and remove it
from the nearest-neighbor structure of schools if its
quota reached zero, and removep andq from the stack.
Note that if the school was below the student in the
stack and it still had positive quota, it would be added
to the stack again in the next iteration, as it would still
be the nearest-neighbor of the previous student in the
stack. Hence, in this case, we can keep the school in
the stack.
Note that the distance between consecutive elements in S only
decreases. That’s why, in Step (4d), q must be the second-from-top;
if q was anywhere else, p would be closer to its predecessor in S
than to q. Here we are using the fact that the preferences of each
element are distinct. In the graph setting, we may use a tie-breaking
rule to ensure that distances are unique.
Each step that adds a new element to S can be charged against a
later pop operation and its associated match. Therefore, the num-
ber of repetitions is O(n). This algorithm gives us the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.7. The symmetric stable matching problem can be
solved in O(n) query and update operations of a dynamic nearest-
neighbor data structure.
By combining Theorem 2.7 with the data structure for planar
graphs and road networks from [7], the stable graph matching
problem can be solved in O(n√n logn) time.
2.3 Circle-growing algorithm
As we mentioned in the introduction, the Gale–Shapley algorithm
requires O(nk) time to find a stable matching between n nodes and
k centers. However, in the graph setting first we need to compute
the preferences, that is, the shortest-path distances between every
center and node. These preferences can be computed by applying
a single-source shortest-path algorithm starting from each center,
such as Dijkstra’s algorithm. The running time for applying Dijk-
stra’s algorithm k times on a graph withm edges and n vertices,
using a Fibonacci heap based implementation of Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm, would beO(k(m+n logn)), e.g., see [3]. In planar graphs, this
could be improved to O(kn) by replacing Dijkstra’s algorithm with
the linear-time algorithm from Henzinger et al. [10]. Therefore, the
time for this preference computation step matches or dominates
the time for performing the Gale–Shapley algorithm.
However, with the following alternative algorithm it is not nec-
essary to compute the distances between all centers and nodes, and
we can do without a separate Gale–Shapley phase of the algorithm
altogether. Instead, we perform the assignment steps of the solu-
tion as part of k instances of Dijkstra’s algorithm, allowing us to
stop each instance earlier once its quota is met. The algorithm is
analogous to the circle-growing method, a geometric algorithm for
a continuous variant of stable grid matching described by Hoffman
et al. [11]. It can be visualized as a process in which we grow circles
from each center, all at the same speed, and match each node to the
first circle that grows across it.
We start k instances of Dijkstra’s algorithm at the same time, one
from each center. We explore, at each step, the next closest node
to any of the centers, advancing one of the instances of Dijkstra’s
algorithm by a single step. We match each node to the center whose
instance of Dijkstra’s algorithm reaches it first. Note that when an
instance of Dijkstra’s algorithm, starting from center c , reaches a
node x that has not already been matched, then c and x must be
the global closest pair (omitting already matched pairs). We halt
each instance of Dijkstra’s algorithm as soon as its center reaches
its quota. This stopping condition prevents wasted work in which
an instance of Dijkstra’s algorithm explores nodes farther than
its farthest matched node. In addition, using this method to solve
symmetric stable matching problems allows us to avoid running
the Gale–Shapley algorithm afterwards.
There are several alternatives for implementing the parallel in-
stances of Dijkstra’s algorithm, all of which result in a running
time of O(k(m + n logn)) for arbitrary graphs and O(kn logn) for
planar graphs. For instance, we can use a priority queue of centers
to decide which instance of Dijkstra’s algorithm should advance in
each step, or we can merge the priority queues of all the instances
of Dijkstra’s algorithm into a single larger priority queue, which is
then implemented using a Fibonacci heap.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present an empirical comparison of the Gale–
Shapley algorithm, circle-growing algorithm, and nearest-neighbor
chain algorithm on real-world road network data. Figure 2 and its
associated Table 1 illustrate the main findings.
3.1 Experiment setup
We implemented the various symmetric stable matching algorithms
of our comparison in Java 8. We then executed them and timed
them as run on an Intel Core CPU i7-3537U 2.00GHz with 4GB of
RAM, under Windows 10.
In the table and figures presenting our experimental results,
we use the label CG for the circle-growing algorithm and NNC
for the nearest-neighbor chain algorithm. For Gale–Shapley, we
consider a variationGSC where the centers do the proposals (which
corresponds to the role of the men in the original algorithm), and
the alternative GSN where the nodes do the proposals. For the
nearest-neighbor chain algorithm, we implemented and used the
dynamic nearest-neighbor data structure from [7].
3.2 Results
Figure 2 shows a clear picture of the respective algorithms’ strengths
and weaknesses:
• The Gale–Shapley algorithm, with a runtime ofO(kn logn),
scales linearly with k . Moreover, because of the memory re-
quirement ofΘ(nk), we could not run it with large numbers
of centers. The version of Gale–Shapley where nodes pro-
pose (GSN ) was about 50% slower than the version where
centers propose. This is explained by the fact that, when
nodes propose, each center needs to keep track of its least
preferred already-matched node. This node may need to be
rejected if the center receives a preferable proposition from
another node. We maintain these least-preferred matched
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Figure 2: Comparison of the running time of the algorithms in the Washington, DC (left, n = 9522,m = 14850) and Delaware
(right, n = 48812,m = 60027) road networks from the DIMACS database [4] for a range of number of centers k (in a logarithmic
scale). Each data point is the average of 10 runs with 10 sets of random centers (the same sets for all the algorithms).
Table 1: Runtime in seconds of the algorithms in the
Delaware road network (n = 48812,m = 60027). Each data
point is the average of 10 runs with 10 sets of random cen-
ters (the same sets for all the algorithms). A dash indicates
that the algorithm ran out of memory.
k GSN GSC CG NNC
2 0.11 0.09 0.06 19.35
4 0.15 0.15 0.06 19.14
8 0.30 0.30 0.10 18.94
16 0.64 0.60 0.16 18.85
32 1.32 1.14 0.17 18.49
64 2.82 2.24 0.29 17.60
128 6.96 4.77 0.43 19.09
256 15.18 9.87 0.59 18.59
512 — — 0.86 17.25
1024 — — 1.13 17.61
2048 — — 1.78 17.95
4096 — — 2.75 18.38
8192 — — — 21.47
16384 — — — 23.95
nodes by using a binary heap of nodes for each center;
however, the overhead of maintaining this heap adds to
the running time of our implementation. In contrast, when
centers propose, each node needs to keep track only of a
single match, so we do not need to use an additional binary
heap for this purpose.
• Our circle-growing algorithm was the fastest of our imple-
mented algorithms in practice, over the range of values of k
for which we could run it. It is also the only algorithm that
could complete a solution for the largest road networks
that we tested. For instance, on the Texas road network,
which has over 2 million nodes, the algorithm finishes in
3 seconds when given 6 random centers; our other imple-
mentations could not solve instances this large. We did not
see significant differences in the runtime between differ-
ent ways to implement the parallel instances of Dijkstra’s
algorithm.
• Additionally, in contrast to the Gale–Shapley algorithm,
the runtime of circle-growing did not appear to be strongly
affected by the value of k . The reason for this is that, even
though the algorithm runs k instances of Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm, the expected number of nodes that each instance ex-
plores decreases as k increases. However, this phenomenon
may only be valid in expectation with randomly located
centers.
• Our nearest-neighbor chain algorithm, with a runtime of
O(n√n logn), is the only one with a runtime independent
of k . Hence, it has a flat curve in the plots1. The Gale–
Shapley curve and the nearest-neighbor chain curve cross
in our experimental data at around k ≈ 4√n, showing
that the constant factors in our implementation of the
nearest-neighbor chain algorithm are reasonable. More-
over, because of its memory requirement of O(n√n), the
nearest-neighbor chain algorithm is the only algorithm
that was able to complete a solution for the entire range
of values of k on all inputs that were small enough for it
to run at all. For instance, in the Delaware road network,
the Gale–Shapley algorithm ran out of memory at k = 256,
and the circle-growing algorithm ran out of memory at
k = 8192, but the nearest-neighbor chain algorithm was
unaffected by the choice of k .
1Even though the runtime of NNC seems to start to increase for the largest values of k
in the Delaware plot, this is likely to be due to an unrelated hardware/software issue,
as other simulations of this comparison did not show this.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
We have defined the symmetric stable matching problem, a sub-
family of stable matching problems which arise naturally when
preferences are determined by distances. We studied its basic prop-
erties and provided the mutual closest pair algorithm, which has
the potential to be faster than the Gale–Shapley algorithm. Future
researchers should consider the algorithms in this paper if they
identify that a matching problem has symmetric preferences. As a
special case of symmetric stable matching, we defined the stable
graph matching problem. For this problem, we compared (a) the
Gale–Shapley algorithm, (b) the mutual closest pair algorithm, and
(c) the circle-growing algorithm, a heuristic improvement over the
Gale–Shapley algorithm.
This work leaves open several questions for future research:
• We know of two settings where symmetric stable matching
arises naturally: the geometric and graph-based cases. In
what other settings does it arise?
• The experiments show that the circle-growing algorithm
scales much better with k than the Gale–Shapley algo-
rithm when centers are placed randomly. However, in the
worst case both are θ (kn logn). For instance, the circle-
growing algorithm achieves this worst-case behavior when
the graph is just a path and the k centers are located at the
first k nodes. Can the circle-growing algorithm be shown
to have a better expected complexity when centers are
placed randomly?
• As Figure 1 illustrates, the regions given by the solution
to an instance of the stable graph matching problem are
not necessarily connected. In many applications, such as
political districting [20], it is necessary to have connected
regions. Because stable graph matching has a unique so-
lution, achieving connectivity will require a relaxation of
the stability property, or a better-optimized choice of the
center locations. We leave these for future work.
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A ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON ROAD
NETWORKS
In this appendix we visualize additional examples of stable graph
matchings in real road networks.
Figure 3 shows the results for 6 additional US states. Figure 4
shows the same road network with different numbers of centers.
7
Maryland (n = 264K ,m = 315K ) New York (n = 709K ,m = 889K )
Colorado (n = 436K ,m = 529K ) Alaska (n = 49K ,m = 55K )
Florida (n = 1037K ,m = 1315K ) Delaware (n = 49K ,m = 60K )
Figure 3: The solutions to the stable graph matching problem for the 2010 road network of six US states, from the DIMACS
database [4]. They consists of primary and secondary roads in the biggest connected component of the road networks. In each
case, n andm denote the number of nodes and edges, respectively, and there are k = 6 random centers with equal quota n/k .
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k = 2 k = 4
k = 8 k = 16
k = 32 k = 64
Figure 4: The solutions to the stable graph matching problem for the 2010 road network of California from the DIMACS
database [4] and different numbers of centers. The road network consists of primary and secondary roads in the biggest
connected component, for a total of n = 1596K nodes andm = 1971K edges. The centers have been chosen randomly, and in
each case they have equal quota n/k . 9
